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Abstract
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political
distortions in the accumulation of public debt. A legislature bargains over the levels of a
public good and of district specific transfers in two periods. The legislature can issue or
purchase risk-free bonds in the first period and the level of public debt creates a dynamic
linkage across policymaking periods. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that public
policies are inefficient and efficiency is increasing in the size of the majority requirement, with
higher investment in public goods and lower debt associated with larger majority requirements.
Also in line with the theory, we find that debt is lower when the probability of a negative
shock to the economy in the second period is higher, evidence that legislators use debt to
smooth consumption. The experiment also highlights two phenomena that are not predicted
by standard theories and have not been previously documented. First, balancing the budget
in each period appears to be a focal point for some legislators, leading to lower distortions
than predicted. Second, higher majority requirements induce significant delays in reaching an
agreement.
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1 Introduction
There is a large theoretical literature, both in economics and political science, aimed at
predicting the evolution of public debt and understanding how its excessive accumulation
can be successfully avoided. The macroeconomic literature has focused on the development
of normative models in sophisticated dynamic environments in which a benevolent planner
optimally chooses public debt to maximize social welfare (see, among others, Barro 1979,
Stokey and Lucas 1983, Ayiagari et al. 2002). This literature has highlighted the role of
public debt for consumption smoothing and characterized its implications for intertemporal
allocation of resources. The political economy literature, instead, has focused on the devel-
opment of positive models which stressed the inefficiencies induced by the political process
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Buchanan 2000). This literature has shed light on how po-
litical distortions can induce rational agents to over-accumulate debt and limit the scope of
consumption smoothing (Persson and Svensson 1989, Alesina and Tabellini 1990, Battaglini
and Coate 2008).
Testing the predictions of these theories has proven challenging. Testing for consumption
smoothing, for example, is difficult when it is hard to measure accurately the shocks hitting
the economy, or the agents’ expectations and preferences. Even more difficult is testing for
the effect of institutions on public debt, since both institutions and fiscal policy are endoge-
nous variables that depend on many other factors that are hard to control for. This leaves
us with many important unanswered questions about these theories and their underlying
assumptions. To what extent do these models accurately predict behavior in empirical set-
tings? Is indebtedness driven by strategic and forward-looking decision makers, as assumed
in these models, or is it more simply due to myopic political agents? How do inefficiencies
depend on the institutions that govern collective decision making?
In this work, we address these questions by examining the theoretical implications of
a simple political economy model of public debt by means of a controlled laboratory ex-
periment. In our model policy choices are made by a legislature that can borrow or save
in the capital market in the form of risk-free one-period bonds. Public revenues are used
to finance the provision of a public good that benefits all citizens, and to provide targeted
district-specific transfers, which are interpreted as pork-barrel spending, or local public goods
without spillovers across districts. The value of the public good to citizens is stochastic, re-
flecting shocks, such as, economic crises, wars, or natural disasters. The legislature makes
policy decisions by voting and legislative policy making in each period is modeled using a
dynamic legislative bargaining as in Battaglini and Coate (2008). The level of public debt
acts as a state variable, creating a dynamic linkage across policy making periods. This model
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has been explicitly designed to capture most of the key issues emerging from the public debt
literature, while at the same time keeping it simple enough to investigate its predictions in
the laboratory.
The model generates predictions about how the legislature uses the debt instrument to
smooth consumption over time and how the political process affects this activity. Fixing the
distribution of the shocks, the model predicts that the legislature issues too much debt and
uses the proceedings to fund transfers targeted to a minimal winning coalition of legislators.
The amount of debt is decreasing in the size of the required majority and converges to the
efficient level (a negative level, corresponding to positive savings) as the decision becomes
unanimous. Fixing the voting rule, the level of debt is a decreasing function of the probability
of the future state in which the public good has high value.
In the experiments, we find evidence that confirms the comparative statics implications of
the model, but the data also provide some surprising findings that suggest new insights about
the effect of voting rules on behavior in legislative bargaining games. A clear results emerging
from the analysis is that players are forward-looking and political institutions have a crucial
role. Aggregate outcomes are consistent with the predicted treatment effects: we observe
higher public good provision and lower borrowing with a higher majority requirement; and
we observe lower borrowing with a higher risk of a shock to society. Political institutions,
however, have a larger effect on outcomes than economic conditions or the perceived degree
or risk; indeed the main driving force behind public debt accumulation is the voting rule
governing collective decision making. An encouraging finding in the experiment is that public
policies are less inefficient than predicted under all voting rules, with approximate efficiency
under super-majority (without the need of a unanimity requirement).
Two other results appear surprising and worth highlighting. First, we find that balancing
the budget in each period appears to be a focal point for the players: this phenomenon limits
the size of the distortions below the levels that we would have expected form the theory alone.
Second, we find that higher majority requirements induce difficulties to reach an agreement,
with such bargaining delays creating a potential transaction cost, akin to political gridlock,
about which existing models of public debt are silent. The problem of bargaining delay may
partly explain why we do not observe unanimous rules used more frequently in real world
institutions. These deviations have important empirical implications for the optimal design
of political institutions and suggest the need of a deeper empirical study of the advantages
and disadvantages of introducing legislative supermajorities or veto powers in fiscal policy
legislation.
Our paper is not the first to study experimentally how agents allocate resources over
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time. Two approaches have been attempted by the previous literature. The first was to
embrace a representative agent model, abstracting from how public decisions are collectively
taken (Hey and Dardanoni 1988, Carbone and Hey 2004, and Noussair and Matheny 2000).1
This literature was mainly interested in exploring the extent to which single agents can solve
discrete-time optimization problems in isolation and is mute on the question of how public
debt is determined in a legislature operating under agenda procedures and voting rules.
The second approach was to study collective decision making by a legislature whose current
decision influences the future bargaining environment, but without allowing the possibility of
issuing debt (see, for example, Agranov, Frechette, Palfrey, and Vespa 2015, Battaglini and
Palfrey 2012, Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey 2012, and Nunnari 2014).2 To our knowledge,
our paper is the first to study the political determination of public debt accumulation with
a laboratory experiment.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on laboratory experiments testing models
of legislative bargaining (McKelvey 1991, Diermeier and Morton 2005, Diermeier and Gail-
mard 2006, Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer 2003, Frechette, Kagel and Morelli 2005a, Frechette,
Kagel and Morelli 2005b). In particular, Frechette, Kagel and Morelli (2012) provide exper-
imental evidence on the behavior of committees allocating a budget between particularistic
and collective good spending. As in our experiments, proposer power is not as strong as
predicted and public good provision is substantially higher than predicted.3 This work,
however, focuses on static environments where a given amount of resources is allocated only
once and cannot address questions about inter-temporal allocation of resources and debt
accumulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the model and
characterize the first best allocation as a benchmark. In Section 3, we characterize the
political equilibrium and its testable implications. Section 4 details the experimental design.
Section 5 presents the experimental results. We conclude in Section 6.
1Cadsby and Frank (1991) and Lei and Noussair (2002) study a community of multiple agents but consider
decentralized decision making. For a survey of laboratory experiments on macroeconomic questions see Duffy
(Forthcoming).
2A somewhat intermediate approach is found in Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2015), who study a
dynamic free rider problems in which players actions are independent but are linked by externalities.
3This is also consistent with the findings of the experimental literature on the voluntary provision of
public goods. For a survey of this literature, see Ledyard (1995) and Vesterlund (Forthcoming).
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2 Model
We study a model in which a committee of n players collectively chooses how to allocate
resources over two periods. There are two goods: a public good, g, and a consumption
good, s. The public good can be produced from the consumption good with a technology
that transforms a unit of consumption into a unit of public good. An allocation in period
t is a vector {gt, s1t , ...., snt } where gt is the public good at t, and sit is the level of private
consumption of agent i at t.
Each citizen’s per period utility function (for s units of consumption and a public good
g) is s+Au(g), where u(g) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously differen-
tiable function, with limg→0+ u′(g) =∞ and limg→+∞ u′(g) = 0. The parameter A measures
the relative importance of the public good to the citizens. The value of the public good
varies across periods in a random way, reflecting shocks to society, such as wars, natural
disasters, or economic crisis. Specifically, in period 1 the value of the public good is A; in
period 2 the value is AH > A with probability p, and AL < A with probability 1 − p. The
value of the public good in period 2 is the state of the world, θ = {L,H}. Citizens discount
future per period utilities at rate δ.
In every period, the committee receives public revenues equal to W . At t = 1, the
committee can also borrow or lend money at a constant interest rate r. If the committee
borrows an amount x in period 1, it must repay x(1 + r) in period 2. Public revenues and
debt are used to finance the provision of the public good and the monetary transfers. Since
the legislature can either borrow or lend, x can be positive or negative. We assume that
the initial level of debt is zero. In period 1, the allocation must satisfy the following budget
constraint:
W + x−
∑
si1 − g1 ≥ 0 (1)
In period 2, the allocation in state θ = {L,H} must satisfy the following budget constraint:
W − (1 + r)x−
∑
si2θ − g2θ ≥ 0 (2)
The committee makes public decisions following a standard bargaining protocol a` la
Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In period 1, one of the legislators is randomly selected to make
the first policy proposal, with each member having an equal chance of being recognized. A
proposal is described by an n+2-tuple {g1, x, s11, ...., sn1}, where g1 is the proposed amount of
public good provided at t = 1; x is the proposed level of public debt; and si1 is the proposed
transfer to district i’s residents at t = 1. This proposal must satisfy the budget constraint
(1) and the non negativity constraints: g1 ≥ 0, si1 ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n. If the proposer’s
4
plan is accepted by q legislators, then it is implemented and the legislature adjourns until
the beginning of the next period. If, on the other hand, the first proposal is not accepted,
then another legislator is chosen randomly (with replacement) to make a proposal. This
process repeats itself a proposal is accepted by q legislators: at that point the proposal is
implemented and the legislature adjourns until the beginning of the next period.
In period 2, the committee inherits the level of debt x chosen at t = 1, and observe the
realized state of nature, Aθ = {AL, AH}. As in period 1, one of the legislators is randomly
selected to make the first policy proposal, with each member having an equal chance of being
recognized. In this case a proposal is described by an n + 1-tuple {g2θ, s12θ, ...., sn2θ}, where
g2θ is the amount of the public good provided and s
i
2θ is the proposed transfer to district i’s
residents in state θ. This proposal must satisfy the budget constraint (2), given x, and the
non negativity constraints: g2θ ≥ 0, si2θ ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n. If the proposer’s plan is accepted
by q legislators, then it is implemented and the game ends. If the proposal is not accepted,
then another legislator is chosen, and the procedure continues until a proposal is accepted by
q legislators: at this point the proposal is implemented and the game ends. In both periods,
we assume that the rounds of bargaining within the same period are fast and so there is no
discounting following a rejected proposal.
There is a limit on the amount the government can borrow: x ≤ x, where x is the
maximum amount that the government can borrow. The limit on borrowing is determined
by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold government bonds that they know will not be
repaid. If the government borrowed an amount x such that the interest payments exceeded
the maximum possible tax revenues—i.e., x > W/(1 + r)—then, it would be unable to repay
the debt even if it provided no public good or transfers. Thus, the maximum level of debt is
certainly does not exceed this level, so we assume x = W/(1 + r).
In a competitive equilibrium, we must have δ(1 + r) = 1. Otherwise, no agent would be
willing to lend (if δ(1 + r) < 1) or to borrow (if δ(1 + r) > 1) and the debt market would
not be in equilibrium. This condition pins down the equilibrium interest rate as a simple
function of the discount factor. In the following analysis and in the experiment, we assume
the competitive equilibrium interest rate, that is, r = 1/δ − 1.
To limit the number of possible cases, we make two assumptions on the parameters of
the model. As will be shown in the next section, the efficient levels of public good are:
gO1 = [u
′]−1
(
1
An
)
, gO2θ = [u
′]−1
(
1
Aθn
)
First, we assume that, without the debt market, in the second period the legislature does
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not have enough resources to cover the efficient level of g if there is a high shock:
W < gO2H (3)
If this assumption was not satisfied, then there would be no economic reason for precaution-
ary savings. Second, we assume that, with a debt market to shift budgets across periods,
there are enough resources available to society to make sure that an optimal solution is
feasible even when there is a high shock in the second period:
W +
W
1 + r
≥ gO1 +
gO2H
1 + r
(4)
Given these assumptions, a benevolent planner can achieve the efficient allocation, but it
can do it only by saving in the first period. In the next section we characterize exactly the
amount of savings required for the efficient solution.
2.1 Optimal Public Policy
As a benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium allocations by a legislature, this
section characterizes the public policy that maximizes the sum of utilities of the districts.
This is the optimal public policy. The optimization problem is as follows:
max
s1,g1,s2θ,g2θ,x

ns1 + Anu(g1) +
{
(1− p) [ns2L + ALnu(g2L)]
+p [ns2H + AHnu(g2H)]
}
s.t. W + x− ns1 − g1 ≥ 0,
W − (1 + r)x− ns2L − g2L ≥ 0,
W − (1 + r)x− ns2H − g2H ≥ 0,
s1 ≥ 0, s2θ ≥ 0, g1 ≥ 0, g2θ ≥ 0

(5)
In (5) we assume that all citizens receive the same transfer: s1 in period 1 and s2θ in period 2
in state θ. This is without loss of generality since with quasilinear utilities the policy-maker
is indifferent with respect to the distribution of transfers. The optimal levels of public good,
in particular, are independent from the distribution of transfers. The first three constraints
are the budget constraints for, respectively, the first period, the second period in the low
state, and the second period in the high state. The other constraints are the non-negativity
constraints for transfers and public good levels.
The following result, proven in Appendix A, characterizes the uniquely defined optimal
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provision of public goods and the feasible range of public debt.4
Proposition 1. The optimal public policy is given by:
xO ∈
[
gO1 −W,
W − gO2H
1 + r
]
(6)
gO1 = [u
′]−1
(
1
nA
)
gO2L = [u
′]−1
(
1
nAL
)
gO2H = [u
′]−1
(
1
nAH
)
Proposition 1 has the following implication.
Corollary 1. The optimal level of debt is negative.
The planner provides the efficient level of public good, that is the level that maximizes
the joint utility of n districts, in both periods and in both states of the world. This implies
that the social planner has an incentive to self-insure against shocks to society which make
the public good more valuable to its citizens—for example, a war, a natural disaster or an
economic crisis. The planner hence saves in the first period, in order to be able to provide
the efficient level of public good in the second period, in case of a positive shock to the
marginal benefit from public spending.
The following result clarifies how the planner chooses public debt:
Corollary 2. At the optimum, the expected marginal utility of the public good is equal in
both periods:
Au′(gO1 ) = E
[
Aθu
′(gO2θ)
]
(7)
Equation (7) is the so called Euler equation for problem (5). It says that, at the optimal
solution, the marginal utility of the public good at t = 1 (the left hand side of (7)) must be
equal to the expected marginal utility of the public good at t = 2 (the right hand side).
4In the Appendix, we also specify an optimal allocation for the transfers. Note that the total amount of
transfers is uniquely determined by the equilibrium public good and debt presented in Proposition 1. The
distribution of these transfers however is indeterminate since a utilitarian policy-maker is indifferent with
respect to redistribution.
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3 Political Equilibrium
We now consider a legislature, composed by representatives of the n districts, that allocates
the resources through the bargaining process described in Section 2. We solve the model
by backward induction.
3.1 Equilibrium Behavior in Period Two
In the second period, legislators take the level of debt incurred in the first period, x, as given
and know the realized state of the world, θ = {H,L}. The equilibrium policy is chosen by
the proposer, as described in Section 2. The proposer chooses the policy that maximizes
his own utility under the feasibility constraints and under the a constraint requiring that a
minimal winning coalition of other players is willing to support his proposal. In a stationary
symmetric equilibrium, the proposer randomly selects q−1 other players out of the remaining
n− 1, each with probability (q− 1)/(n− 1), to be part of his minimal winning coalition, and
treats all the members of his minimal winning coalition in the same way.
The proposer’s problem can be formally written as:
max
s,g

W − (1 + r)x− (q − 1)s− g + Aθu(g)
s.t. W − (1 + r)x− (q − 1)s− g ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, g ≥ 0
s+ Aθu(g) ≥ v2(x, θ)

where g is the level of public good and s is the transfer that the proposer chooses to give
to the q − 1 coalition members. The proposer benefits from the resources he can extract
net of interest payments, the payments to the other coalition members and the cost of the
public good (i.e. W − (1 + r)x− (q− 1)s− g), and from the public good (Aθu(g)). The first
constraint is the budget constraint (given the level of debt inherited from the first period); the
second and third constraints are the non-negativity constraint on public good and districts’
transfers. The fourth constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint: voters support the
proposal if and only if the utility they derive from it (i.e. s+ Aθu(g)) is at least as large as
their continuation value in a further round of bargaining, v2(x, θ). If the proposer does not
receive q votes, a new proposer is chosen at random, so the continuation value v2(x, θ) is the
expected utility at t = 2 when the state is (x, θ) and before the identity of the proposer is
known.
In Appendix A, we characterize the unique solution to this problem and we compute
the value function v2(x, θ) associated with any level of debt incurred in the first period.
We show that v2(x, θ) is a concave and almost everywhere differentiable function of debt x
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characterized by a state-dependent critical value of debt, x̂θ. When x ≤ x̂θ, the citizens
have sufficient resources in the second period for transfers, and the proposer makes positive
transfers to himself and the other members of his coalition. When x > x̂θ, instead, debt is so
high that transfers are zero at t = 2 in state Aθ. The value function fails to be differentiable
at the point x̂θ, where the non negativity constraints for transfers becomes binding.
Taking expectations with respect to θ, we obtain the expected continuation utility V2(x) =
Ev2(x, θ
′). Naturally, V2(x) is also concave and almost everywhere differentiable in x. Now
we have two points of non-differentiability: at x̂L, where the non-negativity constraint for
transfers is binding in state L; and at x̂H , where the non-negativity constraint for transfers
is binding in state H. Figure 1 illustrates it in two examples.
The threshold x̂H is strictly lower than x̂L: when the state is high, it is optimal to
choose a higher level of public good; so, if transfers are unfeasible in state AL, then they are
unfeasible in state AH too. When x ≤ x̂H , the non negativity constraint for transfers is not
binding in either state, and we have transfers in both states; when x ≥ x̂L, the constraint is
binding in both states, so transfers are zero in both states; when x ∈ (x̂H , x̂L), then the non
negativity constraint is biding in state AH , and not binding in state AL, implying that we
have transfers only in state AL.
3.2 Equilibrium Behavior in Period One
Given the characterization of the continuation value function v2(x, θ), we can now solve
for the political equilibrium in the first period, in which forward-looking proposers and
voters take into account how their current decision to save or borrow will affect their future
bargaining power and the future outcomes.
In the first period, the proposer’s problem can be written as:
max
s,g,x

W + x− (q − 1)s− g + Au(g) + δV2(x)
s.t. W + x− (q − 1)s− g ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, g ≥ 0
s+ Au(g) + δV2(x) ≥ v1
 (8)
Again the proposer maximizes his own expected utility, now comprised of the transfer he can
assign to himself (i.e. W + x− (q− 1)s− g), the value of public good in period one (Au(g)),
and the discounted expected continuation value as a function of debt x (δV2(x)). The first
constraint is the budget constraint; the second and third constraints are the non-negativity
constraint on public good and districts’ transfers; and the fourth constraint is the incentive
compatibility constraint for coalition members, where v1 is the expected period 1 utility
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⌢xH
Case 1: Interior Solution
q
n
>
1− AH
AL
(1− p)
p
x
x 
2 ( , ')Ev x A
2 ( , ')Ev x A
Case 2: Corner Solution
q
n
≤
1− AH
AL
(1− p)
p
⌢xL
-1/q 
-1/q 
⌢xH
⌢xL
Figure 1: Value Function in Political Equilibrium.
before the proposer has been selected.5
To solve this problem, we first note that:
W + x− (q − 1)s− g ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0 (9)
5There are two additional constraints: x ∈ [−W,W/(1 + r)]. These constraints are never binding because
of the Inada conditions on u(g), in particular because limg→0+ u′(g) =∞, so we drop them.
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implying W + x− g ≥ 0 So the following problem is a relaxed version of (8):
max
s,g,x

W + x− (q − 1)s− g + Au(g) + δV2(x)
s.t. s+ Au(g) + δV2(x) ≥ v1,
W + x− g ≥ 0
 (10)
If we find a solution of this problem that satisfies (9), then we have a solution of (8). In
(10), moreover, we can assume without loss of generality that the first constraint is satisfied
as equality; so after eliminating irrelevant constants, we have the following:
max
s,g,x
{
x+ Aqu(g)− g + δqV2(x)
s.t. W + x− g ≥ 0
}
(11)
To solve (11), the key consideration is the determination of debt, since this determines the
resources available at t = 1 and at t = 2. As in the planner case, the proposer will try to
equalize the marginal utility of a dollar at time t = 1 to the expected marginal utility at
t = 2. Because the expected value function is not differentiable in x, however, the analysis
is less straightforward than in Section 3. In Appendix A, we show that only two cases are
possible. When q/n >
(
1− AH
AL
p
)
/(1− p), the optimal value is x? ∈ (x̂H , x̂L). In this case
the marginal value of a unit of debt at time t is exactly equal to the marginal expected cost
at t = 2. See Case 1 of Figure 1. When, instead, q/n ≤
(
1− AH
AL
p
)
/(1 − p), debt is at
a corner solution at x̂L, where the value function is not differentiable (Case 2 of Figure 1).
Interestingly, this is not just a theoretical possibility that occurs for non generic parameter
sets: it occurs for any q/n ≤
(
1− AH
AL
p
)
/(1− p).
Notice that in both cases, x? > x̂H . This implies that there are never transfer in equi-
librium in the high value state. All the remaining budget is allocated to the public good if
θ = H. This discussion leads to the following characterization of the political equilibrium of
the two stage game. A formal proof of the proposition is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. In a political equilibrium, policies are given by:
x? =

W−[u′]−1
(
1/q−(1−p)/n
pAH
)
1+r
if q
n
>
1−AH
AL
p
(1−p)
W−[u′]−1
(
1
ALq
)
1+r
if q
n
≤ 1−
AH
AL
p
(1−p)
(12a)
g?1 = [u
′]−1
(
1
qA
)
(12b)
g?2L = [u
′]−1
(
1
qAL
)
(12c)
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g?2H = W − (1 + r)x? = [u′]−1
(
1/q − (1− p)/n
pAH
)
(12d)
s?1 =
W + x? − g?1
n
(12e)
s?2θ =
W − (1 + r)x? − g?2θ
n
, θ = {H,L} (12f)
pi?1 =
(
1− q − 1
n
)
(W + x? − g?1) (12g)
pi?2θ =
(
1− q − 1
n
)
(W − (1 + r)x? − g?2θ) , θ = {H,L} (12h)
where pi is the transfer to the proposer.
Political decision making distorts policy choices. The proposition identifies two sources
of these distortions. First, the proposer must attract support for his proposal from q − 1
coalition partners. Accordingly, given that utility is transferable, he is effectively constructing
a proposal that maximizes the utility of q legislators. The fact that q is less than n means that
the decisive coalition does not fully internalize the costs of reducing public good spending.
Hence, the right hand side of equations (12b) and (12c) have q in the denominator instead of n
(as in the planner’s solution). If the legislature operated by unanimity rule (i.e., q = n), then
legislative decision making would reproduce the optimal solution. This follows immediately
from Proposition 2 once it is noted that, with q = n, the public good levels are just the
optimal levels and the debt level, x?, equals the upper bound of xO. More generally, moving
from majority to super-majority rule will improve welfare, since raising q reduces debt and
raises public good.
Second, the uncertainty about proposal power in the legislature at t = 2 creates uncer-
tainty about the identity of the minimum winning coalition. This uncertainty means that
the proposer is tempted to issue more debt. Issuing an additional dollar of debt would gain
1/q units for each legislator in the minimum winning coalition and would lead to a one-unit
reduction in pork in the next period, when the marginal utility from the public good is
low. This has an expected cost of only (1− p)/n because members of the current minimum
winning coalition are not sure they will be included in the next period, and because there is
uncertainty over the future state of the world.
Comparing (6) and (12a) we have:
Corollary 3. In any political equilibrium, if q < n then debt is higher than efficient and g
is lower than efficient in all periods and all states. If q = n, then both debt and public good
provision are efficient.
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The fact that political decision making introduces dynamic distortions is highlighted by
a failure of the Euler equation (7).
Corollary 4. In any political equilibrium, if q < n, we have Au′(g?1) < E [Aθu
′ (g?2θ)].
The failure of the Euler equation highlighted in Corollary 4 is at the core of the inefficiency
problem associated with legislative choice of public debt. If the same minimal winning
coalition of q legislators chose the policy in both periods, the outcome would internalize only
the utilities of q agents and so would differ from the utilitarian optimum of Proposition 1.
Still, that solution would coincide with the Pareto efficient solution corresponding to welfare
weights that are positive only for the coalition members: and therefore it would satisfy the
Euler equation. The equilibrium of Proposition 2, on the contrary, does not correspond
to the Pareto optimum for any choice of welfare weights. The reason for this is that the
minimal winning coalition at t = 2 is uncertain and typically different from the coalition at
t = 1. Hence the coalition members at t = 1 tend to underestimate the marginal benefit of
resources at t = 2: this leads to a failure of the Euler equation. Therefore the equilibrium
of Proposition 2 is Pareto inefficient.
3.3 Summary of Hypotheses Derived from the Theoretical Model
The model offers a number of testable hypotheses, which the laboratory experiment is specif-
ically designed to investigate.
On Period One Outcomes and Behavior:
H1 Public debt is decreasing in q/n.
H2 Public good provision is increasing in q/n.
H3 If q < n, then public debt is greater than the efficient level.
H4 If q < n, then public good provision is inefficient.
H5 Public debt is weakly decreasing in p, the probability society incurs a crisis.
H6 Public good provision does not depend on p.
H7 Pork is distributed to exactly q legislators.
H8 Pork to the proposer is decreasing in q/n.
H9 Pork to the proposer is weakly decreasing in p.
13
On Period Two Outcomes and Behavior:
H10 For any level of debt: if q < n, then public good provision is inefficient.
H11 For any level of debt: public good provision is weakly increasing in q/n.
H12 For any level of debt: pork to the proposer is weakly decreasing in q/n.
On Dynamic Distortions:
H13 If q < n, there are dynamic inefficiencies: Au′(g?1) < E [Aθu
′ (g?2θ)].
4 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) us-
ing students from the California Institute of Technology, and at the Columbia Experimental
Laboratory for the Social Sciences (CELSS) using students from Columbia University. Sub-
jects were recruited from a database of volunteer subjects. Twelve sessions were run, using
a total of 185 subjects. No subject participated in more than one session. In all sessions, the
committees were composed of five members (n = 5), the exogenous amount of resources in
each period was W = 150, there was no discounting between periods (δ = 1, with associated
interest rate r = 0), and the payoff from the public good was proportional to the square root
of the amount invested in the public good in that period, u(gt) = At
√
gt. The multiplier
of this public good utility, A, was always 3 in the first period but it was either AL = 1 or
AH = 5 in the second period.
Our experimental treatments are the majority requirement for passage of a proposal (that
is, the political institution, q) and the probability distribution of the public good marginal
benefit in the second period (that is, the chance of an economic crisis, p). Six sessions were
run using a simple majority requirement to pass a proposal (q = 3, M), three sessions using a
super majority requirement (q = 5, S), and three sessions under an oligarchic rule (q = 2, O).
In three sessions with simple majority and in all sessions with super majority and oligarchy,
there was the same chance of a high shock (A2 = 5) or a low shock (A2 = 1) to the marginal
benefit from the public good in the second period (p = 0.5). In three sessions with simple
majority, there was a low chance of a high shock to the public good marginal benefit in the
second period (that is, the probability of A2 = 5 was p = 1/12).
Sessions were conducted with 10, 15 or 20 subjects, divided into committees of 5 members
each. Committees stayed the same throughout the two periods of a given match, and subjects
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were randomly rematched into committees between matches. Each session lasted 2 hours:
subjects played 20 repetitions of the two-periods game in all sessions with q = 2, in all
sessions with q = 3 and p = 1/2, and in one session with q = 3 and p = 1/12; they played 10
matches in all sessions with q = 4; and they played 15 matches in two sessions with q = 3
and p = 1/12. Table 1 summarizes the design.
Majority Rule Risk n q p[θ = H] Sessions Committees Subjects
Oligarchy (O) High 5 2 1/2 3 160 40
Simple Majority (M) High 5 3 1/2 3 180 45
Super Majority (S) High 5 4 1/2 3 100 50
Simple Majority (M) Low 5 3 1/12 3 165 50
Table 1: Experimental Design
High Risk Low Risk Optimum
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
Public Debt 140.2 121.3 80.6 147.8 [-6.3, -93.8]
Public Good 9.0 20.3 36.0 20.3 56.3
Pork to Proposer 225.0 150.6 77.8 166.5 -
Pork to Partner 56.2 50.2 38.9 55.5 -
Pork to MWC 281.2 251.0 194.5 277.5 -
Total Pork 281.2 251.0 194.5 277.5 [0, 87.5]
Table 2: Theoretical Predictions for Experimental Parameters, Period 1 Outcomes
Before the first match, instructions were read aloud, followed by a practice match and a
comprehension quiz to verify that subjects understood the details of the environment includ-
ing how to compute payoffs. The experiments were conducted via computers.6 The current
period’s payoffs from the public good investment (called project size in the experiment) was
displayed graphically, with the size of public good on the horizontal axis and the correspond-
ing payoff on the vertical axis. Subjects could click anywhere on the curve and the payoff
for that level of public good appeared on the screen.
Each period had two separate stages, the proposal stage and the voting stage. At the
beginning of each match, each member of a committee was randomly assigned a committee
member number which stayed the same for both periods of the match. In the proposal
6The computer program used was an extension to the open source Multistage game software. See
http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu. A sample copy of the instructions from one of the sessions is in Appendix
C.
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stage, each member of the committee submitted a provisional budget for how to divide
the budget between the public good, called public project, and private allocations to each
member. After everyone had submitted a proposal, one was randomly selected and became
the proposed budget. Members were also informed of the committee member number of the
proposer, but not informed about the unselected provisional budgets. Each member then
cast a vote for or against the proposed budget. The proposed budget passed if and only if
it received at least q votes. Payoffs for that period were added to each subject’s earnings.
At the end of the last match each subject was paid privately in cash the sum of his or her
earnings over all matches plus a show-up fee of $5. Average earnings, including show-up fee,
were $24.
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical properties of the political equilibrium in period 1 for
the four treatments, as well as the optimal policies.7 It is useful to emphasize that, as proven
in Appendix A, given these parameters the public debt and public good levels are uniquely
defined for all treatments.
5 Experimental Results
Because we are interested in the accumulation of public debt and in the role of intertemporal
incentives, we begin the analysis of results by focusing on outcomes and behavior in period
one of the game. The analysis of period two outcomes and behavior is briefly presented in
the second part of this section. Period two results offer fewer insights into the dynamics of
public debt accumulation and public good provision, which is the central question of this
study, as the second period is a static bargaining game with no future considerations.
5.1 Period One
5.1.1 Period One Outcomes
We start the analysis of the experimental results by looking at outcomes by treatment. Table
3, Figure 2, and Figure 3 compare the observed levels of public debt and public good by
treatment. To aggregate across committees, we use the average level of public debt and
public good from all first period committees. We compare these outcomes to the policies
predicted by the political equilibrium and to the optimum.
7As discussed in the following section, our analysis focuses on period 1 outcomes. Theoretical predictions
for period 2 outcomes are summarized in Table 10 in Appendix B.
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High Risk Low Risk
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
Obs: 160 Obs: 180 Obs: 100 Obs: 165
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Public Debt 98.8 5.3 12.5 3.3 -2.9 3.8 57.9 5.7
Public Good 25.9 4.0 36.8 2.2 54.1 3.0 39.8 3.7
Pork to Proposer 108.6 4.7 39.2 1.7 19.7 0.8 49.6 2.8
Pork to MWC 202.0 8.4 112.1 4.8 78.5 3.1 142.2 7.8
Total Pork 222.8 7.1 125.7 4.1 93.0 3.3 168.2 7.1
Table 3: Outcomes in Approved Allocations, Period 1, All Treatments, All Matches
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Figure 2: Average Public Debt in Approved Allocations
FINDING 1. In line with hypotheses H1 and H2, higher q leads to lower public
debt and higher public good provision. The average level of public debt is positive in
Oligarchy and Simple Majority, and negative in Super Majority. According to Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests8, the level of debt in Oligarchy is lower than the level of debt in each
of the other two voting rules (Simple Majority and Super Majority; and the level of debt
in Simple Majority is lower than the level of debt in Super Majority.9 In Oligarchy, 52%
8Unless otherwise noted, our significance tests are based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. The null
hypothesis of a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is that the underlying distributions of the two samples are the
same. We are treating as unit of observation a single group. The results are unchanged if we use t-tests for
differences in means.
9The p-values of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are presented on Table 11 in Appendix B. The differences
between Oligarchy and Simple Majority and between Oligarchy and Super Majority are significant at the 1%
level. The difference between Simple Majority and Super Majority is significant at the 10% level (p-value
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(83/160) of committees spend its whole inter-temporal budget in the first period—that is,
these committees incur a debt of 300 and have no resources to allocate in the second pe-
riod. This fraction goes down to 8% in Simple Majority (14/180) and 1% (1/100) in Super
Majority.
Regarding the provision of public goods, the average level is 25.9 in Oligarchy, 36.8 in
Simple Majority, and 54.1 in Super Majority. These differences are statistically significant
at the 1% level.10
FINDING 2. In line with hypotheses H3 and H4, Oligarchy and Simple Majority
lead to inefficient debt and inefficient public good levels; contrary to hypotheses
H3 and H4, Super Majority leads to almost optimal savings and almost opti-
mal public good provision. In the optimal policy, there is a period one budget surplus
(negative debt) in order to guarantee the efficient provision of public good in both states of
the world in the second period. The minimum amount of budget surplus that guarantees
efficient public good provision when the future marginal value of the public good is high is
6.25 (that is, a negative debt of -6.25). The average debt in Oligarchy and Simple Majority
is significantly greater than zero (12.5 in Simple Majority and 98.8 in Oligarchy). On the
other hand, the average debt in Super Majority is slightly negative (-2.9) and we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the amount saved in committees which decide by Super Majority
is equal to the amount of savings in the optimal policy.11
We draw similar conclusions regarding public good provision. According to t-tests, the
average public good level is significantly lower than the efficient level of 56.25 at the 1% level
for Oligarchy and Simple Majority. On the other hand, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the average public good level in Super Majority (54.1) is different from the optimum.
FINDING 3. In line with hypotheses H5 and H6, higher p leads to lower public
debt but does not affect public good provision. In addition to manipulating voting
rules, we test the effect on public policies of another important dimension: how decreasing
the risk of a shock to society affects the accumulation of debt in the first period. According
to the theory, in a political equilibrium, public debt is sensitive to the probability of a shock:
the current proposer has a larger incentive to provide private transfers when it is less likely
that a shock will occur and public good will be valuable. In the experiments, the average level
0.0557). The difference between each pair of voting rules is significant at the 1% level according to the results
of t-tests (see Table 12 in Appendix B).
10The p-values of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are presented on Table 11 in Appendix B. According to
t-tests, the difference between O and M is significant at the 5% level (p-value 0.0145), the differences between
O and S and between M and S are significant at the 1% level (see Table 12 in Appendix B).
11The p-value associated with a t-test is equal to 0.3799.
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Figure 3: Average Public Good in Approved Allocations, Period 1
of public debt approved in committees that decide by Simple Majority when p = 1/2 is 12.5;
the average level of public debt approved in committees that decide by Simple Majority when
p = 1/12 is 57.9. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.12 The average
public good level in committees that decide by Simple Majority and face either a high or
low risk of a shock to society is indistinguishable (36.8 for committees with high risk and
39.8 for committees with low risk). This lack of an equilibrium treatment effect of p on g is
implied by the theory.
Since private transfers are common, it is interesting to check whether transfers are egal-
itarian or whether they are mainly concentrated on a minimal winning coalition of voters;
and whether we observe proposer’s advantage in the distribution of pork. Figure 4 shows
the distribution of transfers in accepted proposals when committee members are indexed in
decreasing order of their allocation.
FINDING 4. In line with hypothesis H7, in Oligarchy and Simple Majority, a
minimum winning coalition of agents receives a more than proportional share of
transfers; in Super Majority transfers tend to be more egalitarian. In the Oligarchy
treatment, 91% of the private transfers goes to the proposer and one other minimum winning
coalition partner. In the Simple Majority treatments (pooling together committees with
different risk), 87% goes to the proposer and two other minimum winning coalition partners.
In Super Majority, proposed allocations of the private good tend to be more equitable; the
12See Table 11 in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution of Transfers
proposer is allocated 21% and the member allocated the least receives 16% on average. These
observations are in line with findings reported in other experiments on legislative bargaining
(Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer 2003; Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli 2012).
FINDING 5. In line with hypotheses H8 and H9, pork to the proposer is
decreasing in q and in p. Keeping the risk of a shock constant, the average pork to the
proposer is 108.6 in Oligarchy, 39.2 in Simple Majority and 19.7 in Super Majority. These
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.13 Keeping the majority rule constant,
the average pork to the proposer is 39.2 with a high risk of a shock and 49.6 with a low risk
of a shock. This difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.14
The Effect of Experience While the period-one comparative static predictions of the
theory are supported in the data, we observed significantly less debt on average than the
theoretical equilibrium level, significantly less pork than the equilibrium amount, and there
is a lot of variance across committees.15 One possibility is that the multiperiod-period game
is sufficiently complicated for subjects that it takes some time for them to learn. Recall that
13The p-values associated with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are 0.0000 for the three pairwise com-
parisons. The results are unchanged if we use t-tests instead.
14The p-value associated with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is 0.0755. The same difference is signifi-
cant at the 1% level according to the result of a t-test (p-value: 0.0016).
15As a simple illustration of the variance, as shown in Table 5, in the Oligarchy treatment 53% of proposals
exhibit the maximum possible debt, leaving no budget at all for period two, while 21% of proposals have
zero debt.
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High Risk Low Risk
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late
Public Debt 53.9 113.7** 9.4 13.5 1.1 -6.9 36.5 67.3*
Public Good 29.0 24.9 38.2 36.3 57.3 50.8 58.7 31.5*
Pork to Proposer 77.2 119.0** 37.3 39.9 19.8 19.5 34.1 56.2**
Pork to MWC 150.8 219.1* 107.5 113.6 79.9 78.0 100.3 160.5**
Total Pork 174.9 238.8** 121.1 127.2 93.8 92.2 127.8 185.7**
Observations 40 120 45 135 50 50 50 115
Table 4: Average Outcomes in Approved Allocations, Period 1, All Treatments, Early (1-5)
vs. Late (6+) Matches.
the theoretical solution is based on backward induction, so period one equilibrium behavior
imposes rational expectations about period two behavior. Thus it would not be surprising
if these expectations were adapted over time, in response to accumulated experience about
period two behavior. To explore this possibility, we compare the average period one out-
comes in the early matches (1-5), when subjects were relatively inexperienced, to the later
matches (6-20), after subjects had been exposed to feedback and a chance to learn.16 If there
were significant learning effects, in theory this should go in the direction of the equilibrium
outcomes.
Table 4 reports the period one outcome averages, broken down into the two experience lev-
els, for each treatment. Except for the supermajority treatment, where the experience effects
are negligible, all differences are in the theoretically expected direction, that is, the outcome
averages in the later matches are always closer to equilibrium than the early matches. These
differences are statistically significant for the oligarchy and low-risk majority treatments.17
This is summarized as:
FINDING 6. With oligarchy and with simple majority and low risk of a shock,
experienced subjects accumulate more debt, provide less public good and dis-
tribute more private transfers. In the other treatments, experience has no effect
on first period outcomes.
16For the supermajority sessions, there were only 10 matches of play, so the experienced rounds were 6-10.
In two sessions with simple majority and low risk, there were only 15 matches of play, so the experienced
rounds were 6-15.
17Significant differences between the late and early matches are indicated by a single asterisk for significance
at the 5% level and a double asterisk for significance at the 1% level.
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5.1.2 Period One Proposing Behavior
We now turn to a descriptive analysis of the proposed allocations, as a function of q and p.
For this analysis we focus on the amount of debt proposed. Table 5 shows the breakdown of
proposals for the four treatments. In each treatment, the first column lists the proportion
of proposals of each type that were proposed at the provisional stage (i.e., before a proposal
was randomly selected to be voted on). The second column gives the proportion of proposals
of each type that passed when they were voted on.
High Risk Low Risk
Proposal Type Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
% Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac
Positive Debt 0.70 0.88 0.17 0.62 0.20 0.42 0.59 0.78
- Debt ∈ (0, 150) 0.17 1.00 0.09 0.56 0.16 0.50 0.28 0.75
- Spend Everything 0.53 0.83 0.08 0.67 0.05 0.14 0.31 0.81
Balanced Budget 0.21 0.96 0.68 0.86 0.53 0.70 0.29 0.87
Negative Debt (Savings) 0.10 0.94 0.15 0.39 0.27 0.36 0.13 0.41
- Debt ∈ (0,−150) 0.09 0.94 0.13 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.11 0.42
- Save Everything 0.01 - 0.02 0.25 0.07 0.20 0.01 0.00
All Proposals 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.74
Table 5: Proposal Types and Acceptance Rates by Treatment, Period 1
In Simple Majority with High Risk and Super Majority, most first period proposals
balance the budget: in Simple Majority with High Risk, 68% of all first period budget
proposals use exactly W , the per-period flow of societal resources (that is, they balance the
budget); in Oligarchy, Simple Majority with Low Risk, and Super Majority, these balanced
budget proposals account for, respectively, for 21%, 29% and 53%.
In Oligarchy and Simple Majority with Low Risk, most first period proposals accumulate
debt: respectively, 70% and 59% of all first period proposals in these treatments use more
than W . Interestingly, 53% of all first period proposals in Oligarchy and 31% of all first
period proposals in Simple Majority with Low Risk use exactly 2W , that is, they borrow W
and leave no resources available for the second period. These extreme proposals are not far
from the political equilibrium proposals which predict committees in these two treatments
will spend, respectively, 97% and 99% of the overall inter-temporal budget in the first period
(see Table 2).
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Proposals that spend less than W (that is, saved for the second period) were uncommon
in Oligarchy (9%) and Simple Majority (15% with High Risk, 13% with Low Risk), but much
more common in Super Majority, where they account for 27% of all provisional proposals.
In contrast to the data, the political equilibrium proposals should have displayed positive
debt in all three voting rules.
5.1.3 Period One Voting Behavior
Proposal Acceptance Rates. The theory predicts that all proposals should pass. Is this
consistent with the data? Table 5 displays the probability that proposals of different type
will pass for each treatment.
FINDING 7. In Oligarchy and Simple Majority, the vast majority of proposals
pass. In Super Majority, only half of proposals pass. Overall acceptance rates are
89% in Oligarchy, 75% in Simple Majority, and 56% in Super Majority. Even if our legislative
game is different from the standard Baron-Ferejohn setting, it is interesting to note that the
numbers for O and M are nearly as high as the acceptance rates for first-period proposals
in experiments testing that bargaining protocol with simple majority: In Frechette, Kagel,
and Morelli (2003) 96.4% of first period proposals are accepted. One surprise in the data
is the relatively low acceptance rates for proposals with Super Majority. Acceptance rates
differ by type of proposal. Some kinds of proposals are rejected somewhat frequently. This
is particularly true for proposals which do not balance the budget. In Simple Majority
committees and High Risk, only 62% of proposals with debt and 39% of proposals with
savings pass. In Super Majority committees, only 42% of proposals with debt and 36% of
proposals with savings pass. This has a natural interpretation as a laboratory example of
“political gridlock” that can result from using a supermajority rule.
Factors Affecting Voting. Table 6 displays the results from Logit regressions where the
dependent variable is the probability of voting in favor of a proposal. An observation is
a single committee member’s vote decision on a single proposal.18 The proposer’s vote is
excluded.19 The data are broken down according to the treatment. The first independent
variable is the difference between EU(Accept), the expected value to the voter of a “yes”
outcome, and EU(Reject), the expected value to the voter of a “no” outcome (including the
discounted theoretical continuation value). Theoretically, a voter should vote yes if and only
18We cluster standard errors by subject to take into account possible correlations among decisions taken
by the same individuals.
19Proposers vote for their own proposals 97% of the time.
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High Risk Low Risk
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
EU(Accept)-EU(Reject) 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.025) (0.013)
Proposer’s Relative Greed -0.07 -0.57*** -0.09*** -0.01
(0.005) (0.019) (0.025) (0.014)
Herfindahl Index -4.02*** -1.13 2.14 -0.24
(1.112) (1.868) (1.596) (1.321)
Constant 1.60*** 2.48*** 1.82** 0.49*
(0.389) (0.695) (0.755) (0.274)
Pseudo-R2 0.5630 0.4939 0.1390 0.2622
Observations 716 960 716 892
Notes: Dependent Variable: Prob {vote ‘yes’}. SE clustered by subjects in parentheses. * significant at 10%
level; ** significant at 5 significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Table 6: Logit Estimates of Voting Behavior, All Treatments
if the expected utility of the proposal passing is greater than or equal to the expected utility
of rejecting it and going to a further round of bargaining within the same period. This would
imply a positive coefficient on EU(Accept)-EU(Reject).
Voting behavior could be affected by factors other than just the continuation value and
the expected utility from the current policy proposal—for instance, by other-regarding pref-
erences. In order to account for this, we include two additional regressors: a Herfindahl
index, that captures how unequal the proposed allocation of private good is across com-
mittee members; and the difference between the private allocation to the proposer and the
private allocation offered to the voter (what we call “relative greed”). In the case of other-
regarding preferences, the sign on the Herfindahl Index and Proposer’s Relative Greed should
be negative (in the sense that greedier or less egalitarian proposals are punished with more
negative votes).
The coefficient on EU(Accept)-EU(Reject) has the correct sign and is highly significant in
all treatments: the difference between the (theoretical) expected utility of the proposal and
the (theoretical) expected utility of another round of bargaining is an important factor behind
voting behavior. Some of the behavioral factors we introduced are statistically significant.
For the Oligarchy treatment, proposals that share transfers more evenly across committee
members are more likely to receive a positive vote; in the Simple Majority treatment with
High Risk and in the Super Majority treatment, proposals that are less greedy. receive
greater support.
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5.2 Period Two
This section examines outcomes and behavior in the second and last period of the game. At
this point, committees do not make any decision regarding public debt and their budget is
determined by their period one debt decision.
There are two special considerations for the analysis of period two data. First, since the
resources available to period two committees depends on that committee’s period one debt
choice, different committees typically have different budgets at the beginning of the second
period. This is a significant limiting factor for aggregating period two outcomes and behavior
across committees. For example, a significant number of committees borrow W in period one
and as a consequence have zero available budget for the period two. This happens in 52%
of Oligarchy committees, 20% of Simple Majority committees, and 1% of Super Majority
committees. Since these committees are not making any decision in the second period, they
have to be excluded from the analysis, which reduces the number of observations. Second,
since the state of the world is realized and publicly announced at the beginning of the period,
we can pool together the data from the two risk treatments using a Simple Majority rule
(high or low risk).
5.2.1 Period Two Outcomes and Behavior
Table 7 summarizes the period two outcomes. It shows the average fraction of the available
budget devoted to public good provision, private transfer to the proposer, private transfers
to a minimal winning coalition, and total private transfers as a function of q and θ. It
also reports the average ratio between the public good provided by the committee and the
efficient level, given the available resources.20
We highlight three results from Table 7, which are in line with the theoretical predictions:
FINDING 8. In line with hypothesis H10, public good provision is inefficient.
Given the available budget, fewer resources than optimal are devoted to public good provi-
sion. When the value of the the public good is low, the ratio between the budget invested in
the public good and the efficient investment level is 83% with Oligarchy, 69% with Simple
Majority, and 66% with Super Majority.21 When the value of the the public good is high,
the ratio between the budget invested in the public good and the efficient investment level
20In contrast to period one, there is essentially no significant evidence of learning in period two.
21According to one-sample t-tests, these ratios are not significantly different than 100% for Oligarchy
(p-value 0.6134), significantly different than 100% at the 1% level for Simple Majority (p-value 0.0063), and
significantly different than 100% at the 10% level for Super Majority (p-value 0.0537).
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Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj
θ = L Obs: 42 Obs: 188 Obs: 59
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Public Good (% Budget) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Pork to Prop (% Budget) 0.39 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.21 0.01
Pork to MWC (% Budget) 0.73 0.04 0.81 0.01 0.85 0.01
Total Pork (% Budget) 0.96 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.97 0.01
Efficiency (Given Budget) 0.83 0.33 0.69 0.11 0.66 0.17
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj
θ = H Obs: 35 Obs: 89 Obs: 41
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Public Good (% Budget) 0.71 0.06 0.77 0.03 0.92 0.03
Pork to Prop (% Budget) 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01
Pork to MWC (% Budget) 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.93
Total Pork (% Budget) 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.03
Efficiency (Given Budget) 0.72 0.06 0.77 0.03 0.94 0.03
Notes: ‘% Budget’ refers to percentage of the available budget; the budget available to second-period com-
mittees is 150−x, where x is the public debt accrued in the first period by the same committee; statistics for
outcomes as a percentage of available budget are computed excluding committees which have zero budget;
second period committees with zero budget are 40/82 in Oligarchy and θ = L; 43/78 in Oligarchy and θ = H;
56/244 in Simple Majority and θ = L; 12/101 in Simple Majority and θ = H; 1/59 in Super Majority and
θ = L; 0/41 in Super Majority and θ = H.
Table 7: Outcomes in Approved Allocations, Period 2, All Treatments, All Matches
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is 72% with Oligarchy, 77% with Simple Majority, and 94% with Super Majority.22
FINDING 9. In line with hypothesis H11, when the public good is valuable,
higher q leads to higher public good provision. When the public good is not valuable
(θ = L), committee members devote only a negligible fraction of their budgets to public
goods and play a divide-the-dollar game among themselves. On the other hand, when the
public good is valuable (θ = H), most resources are devoted to public good provision. This
pattern is predicted by our model. In the latter case, both the relative expenditure in
the public good and the level of efficiency (as a function the budget) are increasing in the
majority rule adopted. While the difference between Oligarchy and Simple Majority is not
significant, the difference between Super Majority and the other two rules is significant at
the 1% level. Super Majority committees spend 92% of the budget on public goods, for an
average level of efficiency of 94%.
FINDING 10. In line with hypothesis H12, higher q reduces pork to the pro-
poser. As we increase q, the proposer captures a lower share of the available resources for his
own consumption. In the low state, the average fraction to the proposer is 39% in Oligarchy,
28% in Simple Majority, and 21% in Super Majority. These differences are statistically sig-
nificant. In the high state, the average fraction to the proposer is 11% in Oligarchy, 8% in
Simple Majority, and only 2% in Super Majority. While the difference between Oligarchy
and Simple Majority is not statistically significant, the other differences are significant at
the 1% level.
Finally, we look at the proposed allocations, as a function of q. We focus on whether
proposals include private transfers. Table 8 shows the breakdown of proposals for the three
majority rules. For each treatment, the first column lists the proportion of proposals of
each type that were proposed at the provisional stage (i.e., before a proposal was randomly
selected to be voted on); the second column gives the proportion of proposals of each type
that passed when they were voted on. In line with the theoretical predictions, in all voting
rules, most second period proposals offer no private transfers when the value of the public
good is high; most proposals offer private transfers when the value of the public good is low.
As in the first period, acceptance rates are lower as we increase the majority requirements.
Proposals with positive investment in the public good when the public good is not valuable
and proposals with private transfers when the public good is valuable are more likely to be
turned down.
22According to one-sample t-tests, these ratios are significantly different than 100% at the 1% level for
Oligarchy (p-value 0.0001) and Simple Majority (p-value 0.0000), and significantly different than 100% at
the 10% level for Super Majority (p-value 0.0505).
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Panel A: Period 2, Low Value of Public Good (θ = L)
Proposal Type Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj
% Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac
Some Pork 0.99 0.84 0.99 0.77 0.95 0.50
No Pork 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.75 0.05 0.37
All Proposals 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.50
Panel B: Period 2, High Value of Public Good (θ = H)
Proposal Type Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj
% Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac % Pr % Ac
Some Pork 0.54 0.90 0.57 0.80 0.62 0.64
No Pork 0.46 0.94 0.43 0.89 0.38 0.77
All Proposals 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.72
Table 8: Proposal Types and Acceptance Rates by Treatment and Public Good Value
Notes: Observations do not include second-period committees with a budget of zero.
5.2.2 Intertemporal Inefficiencies
Section 3.2 showed that, in theory, political decision making will introduce static distortions
in the provision of public goods. These static distortions are due to the fact that a minimal
winning coalition of size q < n does not fully internalize the benefit of public good provision
for the whole community. In addition to this, the model suggests that inefficiencies will arise
also because of dynamic distortions: the uncertainty over political power in the second period
leads the first period coalition to undervalue the marginal benefit of future resources. This
means that the political equilibrium does not coincide with the Pareto efficient solution for
any choice of welfare weights (for example, weights that are positive only for the first period
coalition members). This distortion is captured in the key theoretical result of Corollary 4:
If q < n, then Au′(g?1) < E [Aθu
′ (g?2θ)]. That is, in the political bargaining equilibrium, the
expected (over the two states) period two marginal utility of the public good is greater than
the period one marginal utility of the public good.
We can test this important implication of the theoretical model, separately for each
experimental treatment, with data from the laboratory committees. Such a test is straight-
forward, since we directly observe for each committee the level of public good in period one,
as well as the levels of public good for that committee’s randomly assigned state in period
two. For each treatment, Table 9 shows the average (across committees) marginal utility of
the public good level provided in each period.23
23 Some committees provide no public good. Since marginal utility in this case is equal to infinity, we use
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High Risk Low Risk
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
Au′(g1) 18.31 7.35 1.64 10.55
E[Aθu
′(g2θ)] 29.46 8.68 5.21 13.10
Difference -11.16 -1.33 -3.57 -2.54
P-value 0.0000 0.0182 0.0003 0.0142
Table 9: Test of Intertemporal Inefficiencies
FINDING 11. In line with hypothesis H13, the provision of public goods
by committees displays dynamic distortions. In every treatment of the experiment,
the expected marginal utility is larger in the second period and the difference between the
two periods is statistically significant at conventional levels according to Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests.24
6 Conclusions
This article investigated, theoretically and experimentally, the accumulation of public debt
by a legislature, operating with procedures that entail bargaining and voting. We ask two
main questions: do legislatures accumulate inefficient levels of debt? To what extent does
this inefficiency depend on the voting rule adopted by the floor?
The experimental analysis of three alternative voting rules (oligarchy, simple majority,
and super majority) supports the main qualitative implications of the theoretical model: a
higher majority requirement leads unambiguously to significantly higher public good produc-
tion and lower public debt accumulation. This result confirms, from an experimental point
of view, the importance of institutions for public policies and the fact that incentives matter
in a way predicted by complex theoretical models. Our model, with supporting evidence
from a laboratory experiment, identifies an important force by which super majority voting
systems may increase efficiency in the inter-temporal allocation of resources. But the exper-
iments also identify some forces outside the model that may work in the opposite direction:
super majority requirements can lead to political gridlock that creates significant bargaining
the marginal utility of the public good level plus a small constant. Table 9 shows results using as constant
0.001. The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests shown in Table 13 in Appendix B are unchanged if
we use a different constant between 0 and 0.1.
24The p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are presented on Table 13 in Appendix B. Using t-tests
on the differences of averages, rather than Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests on the differences of distributions,
the difference is statistically significant for the q = 2 and q = 4 voting rules, but not the q = 3 voting rule
(see Table 14 in Appendix B).
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delays in the decision-making process.
There are many possible directions for future research. On the theoretical side, a model
that allows for imperfect best response (e.g., Quantal Response Equilibrium) could explain
the lower acceptance rates observed with a larger majority requirement. This richer model
might have implications for how delay depends on the voting rule, and thus provide a clearer
theoretical picture of the trade-off between optimal allocations and bagaining delays in the
different institutions.
Our experimental design was intentionally very simple and used a limited set of treat-
ments. We have limited the analysis to legislatures that differ on the q-rule adopted and
use a specific procedure. It would be interesting to consider the impact of different proposal
and voting procedures. Moreover, our political process does not have elections and parties,
and there is no executive branch to oversee the general interest common to all districts.
Elections, parties, and non-legislative branches are all important components of democratic
political systems, and incorporating such institutions into our framework would be a useful
and challenging direction to pursue. Finally, it would be interesting to allow for a richer set
of preferences and feasible allocations, such as allowing for diversity of preferences or mul-
tiple public goods, more than two periods, and to study the incentives for intergenerational
shift of the financial burden in an overlapping generation model.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the optimization problem (5). First note that the budget constraints must be
binding. Moreover, the public good can be assumed to be non negative without loss of
generality. If we ignore the non negativity constraints for the transfers, we have the following
relaxed problem:
max
g1,g2θ,x

W + x− g1 + Anu(g1)
+
{
(1− p) [W − (1 + r)x− g2L + ALnu(g2L)]
+p [W − (1 + r)x− g2H + AHnu(g2H)]
}
s.t. x ∈ [−W,x]
 (13)
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We have the following FOCs with respect to the public good:
Anu′(g1) = 1 (14)
Aθnu
′(g2θ) = 1 ∀θ = {L,H}
It is also easy to see that any x ∈ [−W,x] is optimal in (13). Rewriting (14), we have:
g∗1 = [u
′]−1
(
1
An
)
, g∗2θ = [u
′]−1
(
1
Aθn
)
(15)
Assuming the planner treats districts symmetrically, the associated transfers are:
s∗1 =
W + x− g1
n
, (16)
s∗2θ =
W − (1 + r)x− g2θ
n
, ∀θ = {L,H}
To verify that this is a solution, we need to check that there is an optimal x such that the
transfers are all non negative. For (15)-(16) to be a solution we need:
W + x− g1 ≥ 0
W − (1 + r)x− g2L ≥ 0
W − (1 + r)x− g2H ≥ 0
These inequalities can be satisfied if:
x∗ ∈
[
g1 −W, W − g2H
1 + r
]
where the interval is non empty thanks to (4). We conclude that g∗1, g
∗
2θ, s
∗
1, s
∗
2θ for θ = L,H
and x∗ are optimal policies.
Proof of Proposition 2
We solve the model by backward induction.
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Second Period
At t = 2, the proposer’s problem can be written as:
max
s,g

W − (1 + r)x− (q − 1)s− g + Aθu(g)
s.t. W − (1 + r)x− (q − 1)s− g ≥ 0, s ≥ 0,
s+ Aθu(g) ≥ v2(x, θ)
 (17)
where v2(x, θ) is the utility at t = 2 when the state is (x, θ) and before the identity of the
proposer is known. Notice that the constraints
W − (1 + r)x− (q − 1)s− g ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0 (18)
imply
W − (1 + r)x− g ≥ 0
It follows that
max
s,g

W − (1 + r)x− (q − 1)s− g + Aθu(g)
s.t. s+ Aθu(g) ≥ v2(x, θ),
W − (1 + r)x− g ≥ 0
 (19)
is a relaxed version of (17). If we solve this problem and satisfy (18), then we have a
solution. In (19), we must have s = v2(x, θ)− Aθu(g), that is, the proposer does not waste
resources and makes voters exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting his proposal.
The problem of the proposer becomes:
max
g
{
Aθqu(g)− g + [W − (1 + r)x− qv2(x, θ)]
s.t. W − (1 + r)x− g ≥ 0
}
(20)
To solve (20), let us first ignore the constraint W − (1 + r)x− g ≥ 0. Eliminating irrelevant
constants, we have:
max
g
{Aθqu(g)− g}
implying:
g?2θ(x) = [u
′]−1
(
1
Aθq
)
s?2θ(x) = v2(x, θ)− Aθu (g?2θ(x))
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In any symmetric equilibrium, we must have:
v2(x, θ) = max
{
W − (1 + r)x− g?2θ(x)
n
, 0
}
+ Aθu (g
?
2θ(x)) . (21)
So in this case, since W − (1 + r)x− g ≥ 0 by assumption, we have:
g?2θ(x) = [u
′]−1
(
1
Aθq
)
(22)
s?2θ(x) =
W − (1 + r)x− g?2θ(x)
n
It is immediate to see that (22) satisfies W − (1 + r)x− g?2θ(x) ≥ 0 if and only if:
W − (1 + r)x− [u′]−1
(
1
Aθq
)
≥ 0
That is:
x ≤
W − [u′]−1
(
1
Aθq
)
1 + r
= x̂θ (23)
If (23) is not satisfied, then the solution of (19) is
g?2θ(x) = W − (1 + r)x (24)
s?2θ(x) = 0
It is immediate that this solution satisfies (18), so it is a solution of (17) as well. Moreover
it is also easy to see that with proposal strategies (22)-(24), the expected value function at
t = 2 is (21). We conclude that the equilibrium strategy in the second period is:
g?2θ(x) =
{
[u′]−1
(
1
Aθq
)
x ≤ x̂θ
W − (1 + r)x else
, s2(x, θ) =
{
W−(1+r)x−g?2θ(x)
n
x ≤ x̂θ
0 else
(25)
Given this equilibrium strategy, the value function in state (x, θ) is:
v2(x, θ) =
{
W−(1+r)x−g?2θ(x)
n
+ Aθu (g
?
2θ(x)) x ≤ x̂θ
Aθu(W − (1 + r)x) else
(26)
It is easy to verify that v2(x, θ) is continuous, differentiable everywhere except at x̂θ with
v′2(x, θ) =
{
− (1+r)
n
x ≤ x̂θ
−Aθ(1 + r)u′(W − (1 + r)x) else
(27)
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and limx→x v′2(x, θ) = −∞. We also have:
Lemma 1. The value function at t=2 is concave in x for all θ with v′2(x
1, θ) ≤ v′2(x2, θ) for
x1 ≥ x2and −v′2(x, θ) ≥ (1 + r)/q for x > x̂θ.
Proof. To see that v2(x, θ) is concave, note that the left derivative at x̂θ is − (1+r)n , the right
derivative is:
−Aθ(1 + r)u′(W − (1 + r)x̂θ) = −(1 + r)Aθu′
(
[u′]−1
(
1
Aθq
))
= −(1 + r)
q
< −(1 + r)
n
The result follows from the fact that v2(x, θ) is linear on the left of x̂θ, strictly concave on
the right of x̂θ, and continuous. The first inequality in the statement immediately follows
from (27). For the second inequality in Lemma 1, we have:
−v′2(x, θ) = Aθ(1 + r)u′(W − (1 + r)x) ≥ (1 + r)/q for x > x̂θ
The second inequality above follows from the fact that if u′(W − (1 + r)x) < 1/Aθq then
it would be optimal to have g2(x, θ) < W − (1 + r)x. This implies x ≤ x̂θ, a contradiction.

First Period
At t = 1, the proposer’s problem can be written as:
max
s,g,x

W + x− (q − 1)s− g + Au(g) + δEv2(x, θ)
s.t. W + x− (q − 1)s− g ≥ 0, s ≥ 0
s+ Au(g) + δEv2(x, θ) ≥ v1
 (28)
where v1 is the expected utility at t = 1 before the proposer has been identified, and
δEv2(x, θ) is the expected utility at t = 2.
Proceeding as before, we note that the first two constraints in (28) imply W +x− g ≥ 0.
This means that the following problem is a relaxed version of (28):
max
s,g,x

W + x− (q − 1)s− g + Au(g) + δEv2(x, θ)
s.t. s+ Au(g) + δEv2(x, θ) ≥ v1,
W + x− g ≥ 0
 (29)
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If we find a solution of this problem that satisfies W + x − (q − 1)s − g ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0, we
have a solution of (28).
In (29) we can assume, without loss of generality, that the first constraint is satisfied as
equality. After eliminating irrelevant constants, we can write the problem as:
max
s,g,x
{
x+ Aqu(g)− g + qδEv2(x, θ)
s.t. W + x− g ≥ 0
}
We analyze (29) by assuming that the constraint W+x−g ≥ 0 is satisfied, and then verifying
that this conjecture is correct. From the first order condition with respect to g and x we
have:
1/q = Au′(g) (30)
1/q ∈ −δE∇v2(x, θ) (31)
where −E∇v2(x, θ) is the subdifferential of Ev2(x, θ). We need to have this more general
approach because the value function is not differentiable at t = 2. However, since the value
function is concave, it has a well defined differential. If we denote Ev−2 (x, θ), Ev
+
2 (x, θ) as
the left and right derivative of Ev2(x, θ) at x, then
−∇Ev2(x, θ) = −
[
Ev−2 (x, θ), Ev
+
2 (x, θ)
]
.
Note that we cannot have x ≤ x̂θ for θ = {H,L}, otherwise we would have −v+2 (x, L) =
1/n and −v+2 (x,H) ≤ 1/q, so 1/q < δEv′2(x, θ) and (30)-(31) would not be true. We conclude
that we must have x > min {x̂L, x̂H)} = x̂H . This implies that v2(x,H) is differentiable at
x and that:
δv′2(x,H) = −δAH(1 + r)u′(W − (1 + r)x) < −
δ(1 + r)
q
= −1
q
where, in the first line, the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the second equality
from the fact that r is the equilibrium interest rate.
We have two cases: x ≤ x̂L and x > x̂L. Assume first that x > x̂L. In this case v′2(x, L)
is also differentiable at x and:
−δv′2(x, L) = δAL(1 + r)u′(W − (1 + r)x) > 1/q
Then (31) implies 1/q = −δEv′2(x, θ) > 1/q, a contradiction.
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We conclude that in equilibrium we must have x ≤ x̂L and:
δv′2(x,H) = −AHu′(W − (1 + r)x) > 1/q (32)
δv−2 (x, L) = δv
+
2 (x, L) = −1/n if x < x̂L (33)
δ∇v2(x, L) = [−1/q,−1/n] if x = x̂L (34)
Let’s first assume x < x̂L. In this case, the FOC of (29) with respect to x is
1/q = −(1− p)δv′2(x, L)− pδv′2(x,H)
Then (32) and (33) imply:
1/q =
(1− p)
n
+ pAHu
′(W − (1 + r)x)
After some algebra, we obtain:
x =
W − [u′]−1
(
1/q−(1−p)/n
pAH
)
1 + r
(35)
This conjecture is correct if
W − [u′]−1
(
1/q−(1−p)/n
pAH
)
1 + r
= x < x̂L =
W − [u′]−1
(
1
ALq
)
1 + r
That is if:
[u′]−1
(
1/q − (1− p)/n
pAH
)
> [u′]−1
(
1
ALq
)
Or if:
q
n
>
1− AH
AL
p
(1− p)
If q
n
≤ 1−
AH
AL
p
(1−p) , instead, we have that x = x̂L. So we can conclude:
x? =

W−[u′]−1
(
1/q−(1−p)/n
pAH
)
1+r
if q
n
>
1−AH
AL
p
(1−p)
W−[u′]−1
(
1
ALq
)
1+r
if q
n
≤ 1−
AH
AL
p
(1−p)
(36)
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Since x? ∈ [x̂H , x̂L], we have:
g?2H(x) = W − (1 + r)x = [u′]−1
(
1/q − (1− p)/n
pAH
)
(37)
g?2L(x) = [u
′]−1
(
1
qAL
)
and:
g?1 = [u
′]−1
(
1
qA
)
(38)
For this to be an equilibrium, we must now verify that the initial conjecture is correct. This
means that we need W + x? − g?1 ≥ 0 to be verified. Note that from (36) we know that:
x? ≥
W − [u′]−1
(
1/q−(1−p)/n
pAH
)
1 + r
This implies that a sufficient condition is the second inequality of the following expression:
W + x? − g?1 ≥ W +
W−[u′]−1
(
1/q−(1−p)/n
pAH
)
1+r
− [u′]−1 (qAL) ≥ 0
To prove that this sufficient condition is verified, we first prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. If q/n >
[
1− AH
AL
p
]
/(1− p), then the equilibrium level of debt is inefficiently
large, that is, x? ≥ W−gO2H
1+r
≥ xO.
Proof. Note that:
1
q
=
(1− p)
n
+ pAHu
′ (W − (1 + r)x?)
While:
1
n
=
(1− p)
n
+ pAHu
′ (gO2H)
Subtracting the two equations, we have:
u′ (W − (1 + r)x?)− u′ (gO2H) = 1pAH (1/q − 1/n) > 0
So gO2H > W − (1 + r)x?, that is x? ≥ W−g
O
2H
1+r
. 
Given Lemma 2, we have:
W + x? − [u′]−1 (qAL) ≥ W + W
1 + r
− gO2H − [u′]−1 (nAL) > 0
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where the last inequality follows from (4). 
6.1 Proof of Corollary 3
It can be seen immediately from (6), (12b), and (12c) that g is inefficiently small in period
1 and state L. In state H we have
g?2H(x
?) = W − (1 + r)x?
< W − (1 + r)W − g
O
2H
1 + r
≤ gO1
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2 and the last from Proposition 1.
6.2 Proof of Corollary 4
We have:
Au′(g?1) = 1/q ≤
(1− p)
n
+ pAHu
′ (g?2H(x
?))
= E [Aθu
′(g?2θ(x
?))] + (1− p) (1/n− ALu′(g?2L(x?))
= E [Aθu
′(g?2θ(x
?))]) + (1− p) (1/n− 1/q)
< E [Aθu
′(g?2θ(x
?))]
where the first equality and the first inequality follow from the first order necessary condi-
tions; the second equality is just a rewriting; the third equality follows from (12c). 
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
High Risk Low Risk Optimum
Oligarchy Simple Maj Super Maj Simple Maj
θ = L
Public Good 1.0 2.3 4.0 2.3 6.3
Pork to Proposer 7.0 15.6 26.2 0.0 -
Pork to Partner 1.8 5.3 13.1 0.0 -
Pork to MWC 8.8 26.5 65.4 0.0 -
Total Pork 8.8 26.5 65.4 0.0 [150, 237.5]
θ = H
Public Good 9.8 28.7 69.4 2.3 156.3
Pork to Proposer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Pork to Partner 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Pork to MWC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Total Pork 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 [0, 87.5]
Table 10: Theoretical Predictions for Experimental Parameters, Period 2 Outcomes (Given
Equilibrium Level of Debt)
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O vs. M O vs. S M vs. S High vs. Low Risk
Public Debt 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
Public Good 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48
Pork to Proposer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Pork to MWC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Total Pork 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 11: P-values of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests, Period 1 Outcomes
O vs. M O vs. S M vs. S High vs. Low Risk
Public Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public Good 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.48
Pork to Proposer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pork to MWC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Pork 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 12: P-values of T-Tests, Period 1 Outcomes
θ = L O vs. M O vs. S M vs. S
Public Good (% Budget) 0.32 0.01 0.01
Pork to Prop (% Budget) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pork to MWC (% Budget) 0.21 0.15 0.57
Total Pork (% Budget) 0.32 0.01 0.01
θ = H O vs. M O vs. S M vs. S
Public Good (% Budget) 0.15 0.00 0.00
Pork to Prop (% Budget) 0.10 0.00 0.00
Pork to MWC (% Budget) 0.63 0.00 0.00
Total Pork (% Budget) 0.15 0.00 0.00
Table 13: P-values of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests, Period 2 Outcomes
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θ = L O vs. M O vs. S M vs. S
Public Good (% Budget) 0.47 0.04 0.00
Pork to Prop (% Budget) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pork to MWC (% Budget) 0.03 0.09 0.81
Total Pork (% Budget) 0.47 0.04 0.00
θ = H O vs. M O vs. S M vs. S
Public Good (% Budget) 0.02 0.00 0.00
Pork to Prop (% Budget) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pork to MWC (% Budget) 0.28 0.00 0.00
Total Pork (% Budget) 0.02 0.00 0.00
Table 14: P-values of T-Tests, Period 2 Outcomes
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment we require
your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow instructions carefully. Please
do not open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or engage in
other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books, etc. It is important
that you do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the
experiments.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different
participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions,
partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. Everyone will be paid in private
and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during
the experiment are denominated in POINTS. For this experiment the conversion rate is 100
POINTS equal $1.50.
This is an experiment in committee decision making. The experiment will take place over
a sequence of 20 matches. We begin the match by randomly dividing you into committees
of five members each and randomly assigning each of you a committee member number,
either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The identity of your committee members will never be revealed to
you and your committee members will never know your identity. Each match consists of two
rounds.25 Your committee will have a budget of 150 in each of the two rounds, and in each
round you must decide on how to divide the budget between Private Allocations to each of
the committee members and a Public Project. Proposals will be voted up or down (accepted
or rejected) by majority rule; that is, for a proposal to pass it must get at least 3 yes votes.
Each match starts with Round 1. In round 1 your committee is not required to exactly
spend your budget of 150. Your committee may spend less than 150 in round 1 and carry
over part of it to spend in round 2. Your committee may also spend more than 150 in round
1 and the extra amount will be subtracted from your round 2 budget. Thus, for example,
if your committee spends 140 in round 1, then the round 2 budget will be equal to 160. If
your committee spends 180 in round 1, then the round 2 budget will be equal to 120. Your
committee is not allowed to spend more than it can pay back. Therefore, in round 1, your
committee is free to spend any total amount between 0 and 300.
Your five-member committee will decide how to divide the round 1 budget by majority
rule voting. To do this each member of the committee will submit a provisional allocation
25In the experiment, the two periods were referred to as ”rounds”.
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proposal that specifies six numbers: a Private Allocation to committee member 1, a Private
Allocation to committee member 2, a Private Allocation to committee member 3, a Private
Allocation to committee member 4, a Private Allocation to committee member 5, and a
Public Project allocation that generates earnings to all five committee members. The sum
of these six numbers must add up to a number between 0 and 300.
After everyone in your committee has submitted a provisional allocation proposal, one
of them will be selected at random for a vote as the proposed allocation. All provisional
allocation proposals have equal probability of being selected as the proposed allocation. The
proposed allocation will be posted on your computer screens and you will have to decide
whether to vote yes or no. If the proposed allocation passes (at least 3 yes), it is enacted
and you move on to Round 2. If the proposed allocation fails (0, 1, or 2 yes), there will be
a call for new proposals. This process repeats itself until a proposed allocation passes.
In Round 2, the committee will again divide the budget between the private allocations
to each of the five committee members and a public project. Remember, the budget in round
2 may be higher or lower than 150, depending on whether your committee spent less than
or more than 150 in round 1. The proposal and voting process is the same: each committee
member starts by submitting a provisional allocation proposal.
Your earnings in Round 1 depend on the Round 1 allocation that passed in the following
way [SHOW SLIDE]:
Your Private Allocation in Round 1 + Public Project Earnings in Round 1
The public project earnings are the same for all members of the committee and are
computed according to the formula:
Round 1 Public Project Earnings = 3 (Amount allocated to Public Project in Round 1)0.5
Your earnings in Round 2 depend on the Round 2 allocation that passed in the following
way [SHOW SLIDE]:
Your Private Allocation in Round 2 + Public Project Earnings in Round 2
With probability 1/2, the Round 2 Public Project earnings are computed according to a
HIGH formula:
Round 2 Public Project Earnings = 5 (Amount allocated to Public Project in Round 1)0.5
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With probability 1/2, the Round 2 Public Project earnings are computed according to a
LOW formula:
Round 2 Public Project Earnings = 1 (Amount allocated to Public Project in Round 1)0.5
Independently for each match, at the beginning of round 2, the computer will randomly
assign whether the HIGH or LOW formula for public project earnings applies to your com-
mittee, and it will be revealed to you and the other members of your committee on your
computer screens BEFORE provisional allocation proposal are submitted. The assignment
of your committeeO˜s formula is completely random and independent, and does not depend
in any way on any participantO˜s previous allocation decisions, proposals, or votes.
We will now explain the computer interface. [SHOW SLIDE ] At the beginning of the
first round of match 1, you will see a screen like this. On the right are boxes where you
enter your provisional allocation proposal. On the left is a graphical calculator. If you move
the cursor inside the graph it will display the values corresponding to different allocations
to the public project (labeled project size). At the bottom of your screen is the history
panel. Next you enter your provisional allocation proposal and click submit, at which point
your screen will look like the following. [SHOW SLIDE] Of course, the exact numbers
will be whatever you entered; the numbers on the screens are just for illustration. After
everyone in your committee has submitted their provisional allocation proposals, one of the
five provisional proposals is selected at random by the computer as the proposed allocation
for the committee to vote on. It requires at least 3 yes votes in order to pass. At this
point, your screen will look like this. [SHOW SLIDE] Notice that the screen also shows
the committee number of whose provisional proposal was selected by the computer to be
the proposed allocation. After everyone has clicked yes or no, the vote outcome screen
appears. [SHOW SLIDE] In this example, everyone but one member voted no, so we go
back and start round 1 again, and each committee member is again prompted to enter a
provisional allocation proposal. Notice that this screen tells you exactly how each committee
member voted. After you submit your new provisional allocation proposal the screen looks
like. [SHOW SLIDE] The computer randomly selects one committee memberO˜s provisional
proposal to be the proposed allocation. [SHOW SLIDE]. Everyone in your committee votes,
and in this example the proposal passes. The screen calculates how much you earned this
round and displays that calculation and graphs the project size and its value on the left.
The information is also recorded in the history screen at the bottom. Specific information
for each committee member is ordered by committee number, with your own information
highlighted in red. We then go to the second round of match 1, and your screen looks like
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this. [SHOW SLIDE] The total amount that your provisional allocation proposal must add
up to is displayed. This is equal to 150 plus or minus whatever you underspent or overspent
in round 1. In this example, in round 1 the committee spent 17+27+22+19+41+39=165
for a budget carryover of 150-165=-15. The budget available in the second round is thus
150-15=135. Each member now submits a provisional allocation proposal for round 2 that
must add up exactly to this amount, since it is the last round of the match. Round 2
proceeds exactly like round 1: after everyone submits a provisional proposal, the computer
randomly selects one of them to be the proposed allocation; you then vote yes or no and a
proposal passes with at least 3 yes votes. Once a proposal passes, match 1 ends. You are
then randomly re-matched into a new committee and randomly re-assigned a new committee
member number and match 2 begins. Match 2 proceeds just like match 1.
We will now proceed to the practice match to familiarize you with the interface. You
are not paid for your decisions during the practice match. Please click on the icon marked
Multistage Client on your desktop. Then enter your assigned Computer Name, click enter,
and then wait. Please complete the practice match on your own. Feel free to raise your hand
if you have a question during the practice match.
The practice match is now over. Remember, you are not paid the earnings from this
practice match. If you have any questions from now on, raise your hand, and an experimenter
will come and assist you. We will now begin the 20 paid matches.
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